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THE CASE FOR THE VALIDITY OF STATE
REGIONAL BANKING LAWS
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 1985, the United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to review the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors.' By granting certiorari,
the Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the interstate regional
banking laws enacted by Connecticut and Massachusetts-which were
upheld by the Second Circuit-are authorized under section 3(d) of the
Bank Holding Company Act,2 and therefore constitutional. The
Supreme Court's decision will have a significant and widespread impact.
As of March 15, 1985, eight states in addition to Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts have enacted regional banking laws and about twenty other
states may consider adopting similar laws in 1985.1
The Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes permit out-of-state
bank holding companies to acquire in-state banks subject to regional and
reciprocal limitatiois. Each statute provides that an out-of-state bank
holding company may acquire an in-state bank if: (1) the out-of-state
holding company is located in another state within the New England
region; and (2) the other state provides reciprocal privileges to bank
holding companies located in the bank's home state.4
The Connecticut and Massachusetts laws have been challenged
before the Supreme Court by petitioners Citicorp, Northeast Bancorp
and Union Trust Company on two grounds.5 First, petitioners argue
that the New England regional restriction contained in the challenged
* B.A. 1972, Yale University; J.D. 1975, Harvard University. Partner, Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C.
1. 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982) (popularly known as the Douglas Amendment).
3. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
5. Briefs amici curiae in support of petitioners have been ified with the Supreme Court by
Bank of New York Company, Inc., Chase Manhattan Corp., David F. Bolger Revocable
Trust, the New York State Bankers Association, and jointly by U.S. Senators Alphonse
D'Amato and Daniel Moynihan and U.S. Representatives Hamilton Fish, Robert Garcia,
John LaFalce, Stanley Lundine, Charles Schumer and George Wortley who are all members of
New York's congressional delegation.
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statutes constitutes an unlawful discrimination against states outside the
region (especially New York) in violation of the commerce clause. 6 Sec-
ond, petitioner maintain that Connecticut's and Massachusetts' enact-
ment of parallel statutes with a similar regional restriction represents an
unlawful interstate "compact" in violation of the compact clause.7
Despite the constitutional nature of petitioners' arguments, it is
clear that the validity of the challenged statutes (and of regional banking
laws in general) depends upon the Supreme Court's construction of the
authority granted to the states under section 3(d) of the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHC Act), popularly known as the Douglas Amend-
ment.8 The Douglas Amendment, which was enacted as part of the orig-
inal BHC Act in 1956, prohibits every bank holding company from
acquiring a bank located in a state other than the state in which the
holding company's principal banking subsidiaries are located, unless such
acquisition "is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in
which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication."9
There are two fundamental questions to be answered by the
Supreme Court with respect to the Douglas Amendment. First, does the
statute give to each state a general authority to determine the extent to
which out-of-state bank holding companies may acquire banks within its
borders? Second, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, do
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Petitioners also contended before the Second Circuit
that the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). The Second Circuit rejected this con-
tention, 740 F.2d at 209-10, and petitioners did not initially raise their equal protection chal-
lenge before the Supreme Court. On April 8, 1985, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 53 U.S.L.W. 4399 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1985), petitioners filed a
Supplemental Memorandum with the Supreme Court seeking to reintroduce their equal pro-
tection claim. Metropolitan struck down an Alabama tax on insurance companies which dis-
criminated against all companies which were not incorporated under Alabama law and did not
maintain their principal place of business in the state. The Supreme Court held that the tax
violated the equal protection clause even though it was shielded from commerce clause scru-
tiny by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id at 4402. Respondents filed a Supplemental Brief on
April 10, 1985, in which they opposed petitioners' effort to revive their equal protection clause
challenge and argued that Metropolitan is inapposite to the state regional banking laws chal-
lenged in Northeast Bancorp.
8. It appears to be undisputed by the parties that regional banking laws are constitutional
if they represent valid exercises of the authority granted to the states under the Douglas
Amendment. See, eg., Brief for Petitioner Citicorp at 15, Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of
Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985) (hereinafter Briefs
are cited without the case name); Brief for Petitioners Northeast Bancorp, Inc. (Northeast)
and Union Trust Company (Union Trust), supra, at 15.
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
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the terms and legislative history of the Douglas Amendment, or the prin-
ciples of statutory construction, reveal any limitation on state authority
which would prevent the states from enacting regional bank holding com-
pany laws? In sum, as the Solicitor General of the United States has said,
Northeast Bancorp presents "a relatively straightforward question of stat-
utory interpretation" of the Douglas Amendment. 10
It will be the thesis of this Article that Congress has granted to the
states, under the Douglas Amendment, a general and unqualified power
to determine the extent to which bank holding companies may acquire
banks across state lines. Neither the terms nor the legislative history of
the Douglas Amendment indicate that Congress intended to limit the
authority granted to the states to the single decision of whether to allow
entry by all out-of-state bank holding companies or by none. Yet, this is
the only choice which petitioners would effectively allow the states."
Nor do the language and legislative history of the Douglas Amendment
support petitioners' assertion that the states may not place regional limi-
tations on acquisitions of banks by out-of-state bank holding companies.
In fact, petitioners' construction of the Douglas Amendment is con-
trary to the legislative history of the BHC Act of 1956, as well as con-
gressional enactments both before the 1956 Act and thereafter. As
described below, this history demonstrates that Congress has consistently
sought to provide each state with full authority to determine the banking
structure which it deems most suitable for the needs of its citizens and
local economy. Congress has delegated to the states the power to regu-
late both the ownership of banks by bank holding companies and the
establishment of branches by banks. Congress concluded that state con-
trol of banking structure would ensure a decentralized banking system,
composed of many banks of varying size, which would be responsive to
the needs of both urban and rural communities and small as well as large
businesses.
12
10. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, supra
note 8, at 14.
11. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
12. The federal policy of deference to state control of banking structure has resulted in a
decentralized banking system. See, eg., Bell & Wilmarth, The Interstate Banking Controversy:
President Carter's McFadden Act Report, 99 BANKING L.J. 722, 731-34 (1982). As of Decem-
ber 31, 1983, there were 14,890 commercial banks in the United States, including 4,751 na-
tional banks and 10,139 state banks. FEDERAL DEPosrr INS. CORP., CHANGES AMONG
OPERATING BANKS AND BRANCHES, 1983 at 4 (1984). Even among the 300 largest United
States commercial banks, the total deposits held by each bank, as of December 31, 1984,
ranged from $757 million (Summit Bank, Fort Wayne, Ind.) to over $79 billion (Citibank) and
over $88 billion (Bank of America). The Top 300 Banks in the United States, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 15, 1985, at 44.
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In order to place the Douglas Amendment in its historical context,
this Article will first discuss the development of the United States bank-
ing system through the BHC Act of 1956. Second, the legislative history
of the Douglas Amendment's enactment in 1956 will be described.
Third, the evidence of congressional intent which can be gleaned from
post-1956 statutes will be considered. Fourth, judicial and federal
agency constructions of the Douglas Amendment, and state exercises of
the authority granted thereunder, will be reviewed. It will be shown,
based upon this four-part analysis, that the limitation of state authority
argued for by petitioners in Northeast Bancorp is contrary to congres-
sional intent and the relevant judicial authorities. Finally, in view of the
authority granted to the states under the Douglas Amendment, it will be
shown that state regional banking laws are valid under both the com-
merce clause and the compact clause.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOUGLAS AMENDMENT
A. The Federal Policy of Deference to State Determination of Banking
Structure
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a statute must be
construed in accordance with its historical context and policy, including
its relationship to previous statutory and judicial authorities with respect
to the same or a similar subject matter.13 Yet petitioners ignore this im-
portant principle. Instead, they begin from the hypotethical premise that
there should be free and unrestrained "interstate banking" in the United
States, and argue that the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes are
"protectionist statutes. . . that intentionally discriminate against com-
merce from excluded states."
14
Petitioners' premise is fatally flawed because it fails to recognize the
historical and present reality of banking in the United States. The fact is
that "interstate banking"-in the sense of interstate acquisitions of banks
by bank holding companies-does not exist in the United States except as
permitted by the States. 5 Under the Douglas Amendment, Congress has
13. See, ag., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388-93 (1970); 2A J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.10 (N. Singer 4th ed. 1984).
14. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 11. See also Brief for Petitioners North-
east and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 2-3.
15. As described below, 22 states (including Connecticut and Massachusetts) have adopted
laws which permit out-of-state bank holding companies, under varying circumstances, to ac-
quire in-state banks. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. Under the Douglas
Amendment, interstate bank acquisitions could not occur without these state laws. Thus, as
the Second Circuit stated, "[Tmhe Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes would appear to
promote interstate commerce rather than restrict it." Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208.
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delegated to the States the power to determine the extent to which such
interstate acquisitions may occur. Indeed the business of banking is
"unique among major American businesses" in that banks may not oper-
ate or be acquired across state lines without state authorization. 6
The Douglas Amendment is not an isolated example of congres-
sional deference to state law in the regulation of banking. Congress has
incorporated numerous provisions of state law into the federal statutes
governing national banks and bank holding companies.' 7 In this regard,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has said:
Whatever may be the history of the federal-state relations
in other fields, regulation of banking has been one of dual con-
trol since the passage of the first National Bank Act in 1863.
: * , [U]nquestionably, as in other businesses, federal presence
in the banking field has grown in recent times. But congres-
sional support remains for dual regulation.'"
Nowhere has Congress deferred to the states so completely as in the
regulation of banking structure. As discussed in further detail below, the
McFadden Act19 authorizes each state to determine when, where and
how both national banks and state banks may establish branches within
its borders.2 0 Moreover, by authorizing each state to regulate acquisi-
tions of in-state banks by out-of-state bank holding companies, the Doug-
las Amendment ensures that each state can maintain "control over the
ownership of banks within its borders."'"
As shown below, the federal government has consistently followed a
policy of deference to state control over banking structure since the
1830's. This federal policy has been based upon two essential determina-
tions: (1) that federal control over banking structure could cause a con-
centration of financial resources which would be dangerous to the
political and economic health of the nation; and (2) that state control
over banking structure would result in a decentralized banking system
responsive to the differing needs of local communities and businesses.
Accordingly, petitioners' attacks on the constitutionality of the Connecti-
16. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOEsrRA L. REV. 1133, 1137, 1167-68 (1981).
17. See, eg., Indep. Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 932 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288,
1291-92, 1296-97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
18. National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
20. First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969). See infra notes
34-42 and accompanying text.
21. Girard Bank v. Board of Governors, 748 F.2d 838, 842 (3d Cir. 1984).
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cut and Massachusetts statutes must be judged against this historical
background of delegated state authority over the structure of the banking
industry, instead of petitioners' premise of nationwide "interstate
banking.
2 2
B. The History of State Control of Banking Structure from the Demise
of the Second Bank of the United States through the
McFadden Act, as Amended by the Banking Act of
1933
1. President Jackson's veto of the rechartering of the Second Bank of
the United States
Prominent among those who supported President Andrew Jackson's
veto of the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States in 1832
were the owners of state banks-both in the East and in the West-who
resented the Second Bank's exclusive control over the nation's currency
and, thereby; the effective allocation of credit resources. Moreover, state
banks were the direct beneficiaries of Jackson's decision in 1833 to re-
move the federal government's deposits from the Second Bank and place
them in selected state banks.23
Jackson and those who supported him viewed the Second Bank as a
dangerous center of concentrated financial power which threatened polit-
ical and social democracy.2 4 Accordingly, the fight against the central-
ized financial resources of the Second Bank led naturally to the state
"free banking" movement which began in the late 1830's. As typified by
New York's banking law of 1838, "free banking" statutes permitted state
banks to be chartered under general rules of incorporation rather than
requiring special acts of the legislature. The intent of these state laws
was "to encourage the growth of banking, but at the same time. . . to
prevent the concentration of banking power."2 "
22. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), where the Supreme Court
upheld a discriminatory South Carolina tax on out-of-state insurance companies based upon
the authority granted to the states under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Court stated: "No
phase has had a more atypical history than regulation of the business of insurance. This fact is
important for the problems now presented. They have origin in that history. Their solution
cannot escape its influence." Iae at 413. See also infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
23. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 72-81 (1974); A.
SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 74-80, 90-92, 97-102 (1945).
24. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 23, at 74-79; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 23, at 89-
94, 97-102, 105-10.
25. Golembe, Our Remarkable Banking System, 53 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1967). See
also R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 23, at 81-82.
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2. The National Bank Act of 1864
Following the expiration of the Second Bank's charter in 1836, the
federal government did not again enter the bank chartering field until the
Civil War. During the interim period, the states were the exclusive char-
tering and regulatory authorities for banks. In 1863, responding to
problems encountered in financing the war effort, Congress enacted the
National Currency Act 26-replaced by the National Bank Act of
1864 27-to authorize a system of fedrally-chartered but privately-owned
national banks which would issue a new national paper currency. How-
ever, instead of creating another central bank (a step which was not
taken until the Federal Reserve Act of 191328), Congress chose the "free
banking" model for the new system of privately-owned national banks.2 9
The National Bank Act did not give the new national banks any
branching authority, a situation which placed such banks at a competi-
tive disadvantage with state banks in states which permitted branching.
This situation was only slightly remedied by an 1865 statute30 which per-
mitted state banks converting to national charter to retain their existing
branches, and a 1918 law31 which allowed national banks to acquire
branches by consolidating with a converted state bank.32 Moreover, in
1924, when a St. Louis national bank sought to establish a branch in
violation of Missouri's branching law for state banks, the Supreme Court
upheld the application of the state law to the national bank.33 Thus in
1924, as well as 1836, state law effectively governed the nation's banking
structure.
3. The McFadden Act of 1927 and the Banking Act of 1933
In response to the competitive inequality faced by national banks
with respect to branching, Congress adopted the McFadden Act of
1927,11 which authorized national banks to establish branches within the
26. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
27. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 165).
28. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
29. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 113941; Golembe, supra note 25, at 1094-97. It is true
that Congress in 1865 sought to drive state banks out of existence by placing a prohibitive tax
on the circulation of bank notes by state banks. This effort failed, however, because state
banks successfilly shifted to a deposit-based business, and Congress never again took such a
preemptive step. Id at 1094.
30. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 7, 13 Stat. 484 (proviso).
31. Act of Nov. 7, 1918, ch. 209, 40 Stat. 1043 (1918).
32. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 1153.
33. First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656-60 (1924).
34. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36).
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municipality where their main banking facilities were located, but only if
permitted by state law. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee
stated that the McFadden Act would permit "national banks to have
branches in those cities where State banks are allowed to have them under
State laws."' 35
During the Great Depression, the Comptroller of the Currency (the
regulator of national banks) and others argued that national banks
should be authorized to branch regardless of state law. Their argument
was, in part, that smaller rural banks were undercapitalized and should
be replaced by branches of larger banks.36 In accordance with this view,
Senator Carter Glass of Virginia introduced a bill 7 in 1932 which would
have authorized national banks to establish branches outside of their
home city: (1) at any point within their home state, "irrespective of State
laws;" and (2) at any point in contiguous states within fifty miles of their
main office, subject to the approval of the Federal Reserve Board.3"
Although Senator Glass' bill passed the Senate, it was strongly op-
posed on the ground that it would deprive the states of their control over
banking structure and would lead to a greater concentration of banking
resources. Thus, the minority of the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee stated:
There is a movement on foot to control the banking industry of
the United States by centralization.. . . The only way it can
be accomplished, apparently, is through nation-wide branch
banking and the complete elimination of the unit bank.
Our dual system of banking has been one of the great mo-
tivating factors in making the United States the outstanding
country that it is to-day. Our country is too large, too widely
diversified, to expect one banking system to be so versatile as to
deal with so complex a situation efficiently ...
The placing of our banking structure with the one
overburdened bureaucracy in Washington is in direct violation
of the principle of State rights.39
Senator Glass' bill was defeated in the House in 1932, and when he
35. S. REP. No. 473, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1926) (emphasis added), quoted in First
Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 258 (1966).
36. See First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966).
37. S. 4412, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
38. See S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 11, 16 (1932) (emphasis added).
39. S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. Part II, 3-4 (1932) (minority views).
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introduced a new bill in 1933, 4 it provided that national banks could
establish branches only within their home state and only to the extent per-
mitted by state law. Thus, Senator Glass explained that the new branch-
ing provision, which was adopted as section 23 of the Banking Act of
1933,41 would permit national banks to establish branches "in only those
States the laws of which permit branch banking, and only to the extent
that the State laws permit branch banking."'42
It is also noteworthy that proponents of the dual banking system in
Congress defeated proposals in 1932-33 to provide deposit insurance only
for national banks and state banks which were members of the Federal
Reserve System. Such proposals were opposed as attempts "to destroy
the State banking system."'43 Instead, the proponents of the dual banking
system obtained deposit insurance coverage under section 8 of the Bank-
ing Act of 1933 for all state as well as national banks, thereby preserving
"a decentralized unit banking system, subject to a minimum of federal
control."'
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY
AcT OF 1956
A. The House and Senate Committee Proposals
As already shown, the McFadden Act, as amended by the Banking
Act of 1933, firmly established state.control over branching by national
and state banks, and thereby sought.1o provide each state with authority
to determine its banking structure In the early 1950's, however, sup-
porters of the decentralized dual banking system became concerned with
the growth of multibank holding companies. It was evident that large
banking organizations were using the holding company mechanism to
evade state branching laws by creating numerous subsidiary banks, both
within and across state lines, and then operating such banks in a unitary
fashion similar to branches. The development of multibank holding
companies was most strongly opposed by the "independent" unit banks
40. S. 1631, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
41. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 189 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c), (d)).
42. 76 CONG. REc. 2511 (1933), quoted in First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank &
Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966). See also S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 16-17
(1933).
43. S. REP. No. 584, Part II, supra note 39, at 6-7.
44. Golembe, supra note 25, at 1098-100. The federal deposit insurance program as origi-
nally enacted in 1933 required state nonmember banks to apply for membership in the Federal
Reserve System in order to obtain insurance, but the requirement of actual membership was
postponed and later rescinded, thereby allowing state banks to retain deposit insurance in their
status as nonmember banks. Id at 1099-100.
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and their supporters, who called for a federal law which would: (1) pro-
hibit any further acquisitions of banks across state lines by bank holding
companies; and (2) permit bank holding companies to acquire banks
within their home state only to the extent that state law would permit
banks to establish branches under the same circumstances.45
In response to the independent bankers' proposals, the House Bank-
ing and Currency Committee reported a bill" which was passed by the
full House in 1955. Section 5(c) of the bill provided that bank holding
companies could not acquire any additional banks outside of their home
state, and limited further home state acquisitions to those areas in which
bank branching was permitted or in which holding company acquisitions
had been specifically authorized by state law.47
In explaining the objectives of the bill, the House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee stressed that the unrestricted ability of bank holding
companies to acquire banks within and across state lines would under-
mine state control of banking structure pursuant to the McFadden Act.
Moreover, the House Committee believed that unrestrained bank holding
company expansion would result in greater concentration of financial re-
sources and thereby diminish the availability of credit to local communi-
ties and small businesses:
Congress has declared its approval of the American system of
local independent and competitive banks, and has left the mat-
ter of branches to the States to determine, each State for
itself ....
. . . [T]he declared will of Congress in favor of independ-
ent competitive banking is being thwarted by indirect branch
banking, through the mechanism of the holding company.
. . . [T]his is the only country left where most communi-
ties are served by home-owned and home-managed banks
45. See, eg., Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 2674
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-63 (1955) (testi-
mony of W.J. Bryan, president, Indep. Bankers Ass'n of America) [hereinafter cited as 1955
House Hearings]; id at 163-73 (testimony of H.J. Harding, president, Indep. Bankers Ass'n,
12th Federal Reserve District); Control of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 880, S.
2350 and HR. 6227 Before a Subcorm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 104-31 (1955) (testimony of Messrs. Bryan and Harding) [hearinafter cited as
1955 Senate Hearings].
46. H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
47. H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(c) (1955), reprinted in 1955 Senate Hearings,
supra note 45, at 25. See also H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 24 (1955).
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which are aware of and responsive to the needs of the people of
their areas. Our independent banking system has been a vital
factor in the development of the United States ...
Other countries must depend on 3, 4 or 5 banks having up
to thousands of branches. Policies and important credit deci-
sions are made hundreds or thousands of miles from many of
the branches .... This inevitably tends toward concentration
in all lines, cartels, the stifling of new enterprises, and stagna-
tion . 48
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, while agreeing
with the House that a federal law regulating bank holding companies was
needed,49 took a different approach with respect to holding company ac-
quisitions of banks. Instead of adopting an absolute federal prohibition
against all holding company acquisitions across state lines or within
states where branching was not permitted, the Senate Committee's bill5°
provided that such acquisitions would be permitted, subject to: (1) prior
Federal Reserve Board approval; and (2) the ability of each state to af-
firmatively prohibit such acquisitions.51
B. THE DOUGLAS AMENDMENT
With respect to interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding
companies, the American Bankers Association (ABA) (representing
ninety-eight percent of United States banks) did not favor either the
House bill or the Senate Committee bill. Instead, the ABA proposed a
compromise which would confer the following authority upon the states
over bank holding company acquisitions:
It is vital that each state should be permitted to determine...
whether or not it should permit a holding company domiciled
48. H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 47, at 2,3, 6 (emphasis added).
49. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2482, 2483.
50. S. 2577, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
51. S. REP. No. 1095, supra note 49, at 2489-93. In this regard, Senator Willis Robertson
of Virginia, chief sponsor and floor manager of S. 2577, stated that § 7 of the bill (which was
enacted as § 7 of the BHC Act) would preserve the authority of each state "to permit or
prohibit the operation of bank holding companies within its borders," including the specific
power to prohibit acquisitions of in-state banks by out-of-state bank holding companies. 102
CONG. REc. 6751, 6752 (1956) (quoting 1952 speech by Sen. Maybank); id. at 6855 (colloquy
between Senators Langer and Capehart). As an example of state legislation which would be
permissible under § 7, Senator Robertson pointed to a Georgia statute which prohibited all in-
state and out-of-state holding companies from acquiring more than 15% of the voting stock of
two or more Georgia banks. Id at 6752-53.
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in another State to cross State lines and operate within such
State.. . . [N]o bank holding company should be permitted to
expand outside of the State in which it is domiciled unless the
laws of such outside State expressly permit such expansion.
5 2
The ABA compromise position was similar to a floor amendment
proposed by Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois during the Senate debate on
its bill. 3 Senator Douglas' amendment, which was enacted as section
3(d) of the original BHC Act of 1956, provided that no bank holding
company could acquire a bank located in a state other than the state in
which the holding company's principal place of business was located or
its "principal operations" were conducted, unless such acquisition was
"specifically authorized" by the statutory law of such other state.5 4 The
Douglas Amendment was supported by the independent bankers (who
found it an acceptable substitute for section 5(c) of the House bill) as well
as the ABA."
Senator Douglas emphasized that the primary purpose of his
amendment was to carry out the long-established federal policy against
the undue concentration of financial resources. He declared that this
policy was necessary to ensure both political liberty and economic
competition:
[The pending bill, and [the] amendment. . . are in the true
American tradition, for what the sponsors of the amendment
are seeking to do is to prevent an undue concentration of bank-
ing and financial power, and instead to keep the private control
of credit diffused as much as possible. For we know that when
the credit resources of a country become concentrated and fall
into a few hands, then the industry and trade of that country
also become concentrated.
Andrew Jackson realized all this when he faced Nicholas
52. 1955 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 406 (testimony of G.R. Boyles on behalf of the
ABA); 1955 Senate hearings, supra note 45, at 289 (supplemental statement of Mr. Boyles on
behalf of the ABA).
53. See 102 CONG. REC. 6860 (1956). For the Senate debates on the Douglas Amend-
ment, see ia at 6760-61, 6856-63. Senator Douglas previously had offered his amendment
before the Senate Committee, but it was defeated by a vote of 6-4. Id. at 6761, 6862.
54. Id at 6857 (emphasis added). The Douglas Amendment was amended in 1966 to
remove the reference to the principal office or place of business of a bank holding company,
and to specify that the state of its "principal operations" would be deemed to be the state in
which its subsidiary banks had the largest total amount of deposits. See infra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text.
55. 102 CONG. REC. 6760 (1956) (statement of Sen. Robertson); id. at 6860 (statement of
Sen. Douglas).
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Biddle and the SecQnd Bank of the United States. . . . Jack-
son not only opposed the private creation of monetary purchas-
ing power by the [B]ank, but also its tendency toward
monopolizing credit by driving out the small banks. He wanted
credit and banking to be decentralized and diffused so that men
might be free.56
Senator Douglas pointed out that where banking resources had become
concentrated in a few giant banks-as in Canada, Great Britain, and
Germany-competition had diminished and industry had become con-
centrated. He also asserted that the concentration of banking resources
in Germany had contributed to the rise of Hitler. Therefore, he argued
that the pending bill and his amendment were critically needed to "check
and, if possible, to roll back the concentration of banking and credit" in
the United States."
Senator Douglas also contended that his amendment was necessary
to prevent further evasion by bank holding companies of restrictions im-
posed by state law and the McFadden Act upon bank branching. In this
regard, he stated:
[O]ur amendment aims. . . to carry over into the field of hold-
ing companies the same provisions which already apply for
branch banking under the McFadden Act-namely, our
amendment will permit out-of-State holding companies to ac-
quire banks in other States only to the degree that State laws
expressly permit them; and that is the provision of the McFad-
den Act.
Holding companies have been developed in part-I would
say largely-in order to get around restrictions on branch
banking.
[Our amendment] is a logical continuation of the princi-
ples of the McFadden Act, which tried to prevent the Federal
power from being used to permit national banks to expand
across State lines in a way contrary to State policy. .. .
Congress plainly understood that the Douglas Amendment would
give each state full authority to decide whether to permit entry by out-of-
state bank holding companies on a case-by-case and state-by-state basis.
56. 102 CONG. REc. 6857 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
57. Id. See also id. at 6861-62 (statements of Sen. Payne and Sen. Morse).
58. Id. at 6858, 6860 (statement of Sen. Douglas) (emphasis added).
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Both the ABA (in its testimony before the House and Senate Commit-
tees) and Senator Douglas (during the Senate debate) said that the
Amendment would require state authorization for each acquisition of an
in-state bank by "a bank holding company" located in "another State." 9
Senator Robertson, who opposed the Douglas Amendment, acknowl-
edged that the Amendment "specifibally says no bank holding company
in the future may cross a State line unless the laws of the State involved
permit it to do so."'
In sum, there can be no doubt that Congress delegated to each state,
under the Douglas Amendment, a general and unqualified power to de-
termine the degree to which any out-of-state bank holding company from
any state could acquire banks within that state's borders. Nowhere did
Congress indicate an intent to limit a state's authority under section 3(d)
to the mere choice of whether to permit entry by all out-of-state bank
holding companies or by none. Nor. did Congress anywhere express a
purpose to require a state to treat bank holding companies from all other
states in the same manner. Thus, petitioners' argument against the au-
thority of states to impose "regional" limitations on entry by out-of-state
bank holding companies finds no support in the legislative history of the
Douglas Amendment.
Indeed, Congress understood that the Douglas Amendment would
cause discrimination against interstate commerce. Senator Bennett of
Utah opposed the Douglas Amendment on this very ground. He argued
that it would "require every State that does not now have legislation
prohibiting bank holding companies to discriminate in favor of such cor-
porations that may be resident in their State and against bank holding
companies resident in any other State and requires affirmative legislation
to remove the discrimination.61 Senator Bennett further contended that
"[flor Congress to require discrimination in interstate commerce, and
then leave it to the several States to correct it, is a strange approach."62
Nevertheless, the Douglas Amendment was adopted by an overwhelming
58-18 vote of the Senate, 63 and unanimously approved by the House,
6
4
59. 1955 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 406; 1955 Senate Hearings, supra note 45, at
289; 102 CONG. REc. 6860 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas) (emphasis added). See also id.
at 6862 (statement of Sen. Payne).
60. Id at 6760 (emphasis added).
61. Id at 6860 (statement of Sen. Bennett) (emphasis added). See also id. at 6862 (state-
ment of Sen. Bricker).
62. Id at 6860 (statement of Sen. Bennett) (emphasis added).
63. Id at 6863. In addition, of the nine absent and nonvoting Senators who indicated their
views on the Douglas Amendment, seven supported the Amendment. Id.
64. Id at 7165.
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thereby confirming Congress' clear decision to authorize discrimination
against interstate commerce with respect to acquisitions of banks by bank
holding companies.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL REAFFIRMATIONS OF STATE AUTHORITY
UNDER THE DOUGLAS AMENDMENT
On several occasions since 1956, Congress has reconsidered the pol-
icy on interstate banking structure set forth in the Douglas Amendment.
In each instance, Congress has confirmed the authority of the states to
determine the extent to which bank holding companies may acquire
banks located in other states.
In 1966, Congress amended the Douglas Amendment by providing
that the "home state" of each bank holding company would be the state
in which its operations were "principally conducted" (defined as the state
in which the total deposits of the holding company's banking subsidiaries
were the largest). The 1966 amendment removed the previous alterna-
tive reference to the "principal office and place of business" of a bank
holding company.65 The amendment was designed to preclude the possi-
bility that a holding company might establish its principal office in one
state and its principal operations in another, and then claim that it had
two "home states" in which it could acquire banks without the approval
of either state. 6 Thus, the 1966 amendment reiterated Congress' firm
intent to prohibit bank holding companies from acquiring banks in more
than one state without state approval.
Twelve years later, Congress enacted the International Banking Act
of 1978 (IBA), which extended the dual system of federal and state regu-
lation to foreign banks operating in the United States.67 A principal rea-
son for the IBA was that, prior thereto, foreign banks and bank holding
companies were not subject to the McFadden Act or the Douglas
Amendment. Consequently, these foreign institutions could own de-
posit-taking branches or subsidiary banks in more than one state. Con-
gress determined that this situation gave foreign banks a significant
competitive advantage over United States banks because foreign banks
could accept "domestic" deposits (that is, deposits from United States
65. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7(d), 80 Stat. 236, 238 (1966) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
66. See S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2385, 2393.
67. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-
3108 (1982)). Prior to the IBA, foreign banks had been regulated almost exclusively by the
states. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 6-7 (1978).
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residents) in more than one state.6 Congress also concluded that to "ex-
empt" foreign banks from the McFadden/Douglas limitations "could
have untoward effects on the concentration of banking resources in the
United States and would be fundamentally destructive of our dual bank-
ing system.
' 69
Accordingly, Congress decided to apply the McFadden Act and the
Douglas Amendment to foreign banks operating in the United States.
Under section 4(h) of the IBA,70 a foreign bank may establish more than
one branch in its "home state" only to the extent that a national bank
located in the same state may establish branches under the McFadden
Act.7 1 In addition, under section 5(a) of the IBA,72 a foreign bank may
not: (1) establish a branch which accepts domestic deposits outside of its
home state; or (2) acquire a subsidiary bank outside of its home state
unless such acquisition would be permitted under the Douglas Amend-
ment by a domestic bank holding company located in the same state.73
Thus, in 1978 Congress again reaffirmed the policies of the McFad-
den Act and the Douglas Amendment by extending those policies to for-
eign banks. Congress' action in this regard is significant because it was
taken despite considerable criticism of the McFadden Act during the
hearings on the IBA. In response to such criticism, Congress directed
President Carter, under section 14 of the IBA, to submit recommenda-
tions to Congress '4with regard to the applicability of the McFadden Act
68. S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 67, at 7-8. Congress cited testimony that United States
banks were not at a disadvantage with respect to foreign banks in other areas of the banking
business because United States banks and their holding companies could make commercial and
consumer loans, accept foreign-related deposits, and provide financially-related nonbanking
services on a nationwide basis through loan production offices, Edge Act corporations and
nonbanking subsidiaries. Id. at 8. One commentator has pointed out that bank holding com-
panies today can offer a complete array of banking and related services on an interstate basis,
except for the acceptance of deposits through banks or bank branches. Ginsburg, supra note 16,
at 1175-219.
69. S. R P. No. 1073, supra note 67, at 9-10.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(h) (1982).
71. The "home state" of a foreign bank, which is determined pursuant to § 5(c) of the IBA
and regulations issued thereunder by the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 211.22 (1984), is
generally the first state in which the foreign bank: (1) establishes a branch which accepts
domestic deposits; or (2) acquires a subsidiary bank.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (1982).
73. Id See S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 67, at 10-11, 21-22. Section 5(a) of the IBA
permits a foreign bank to establish branches outside of its home state to the extent permitted
by state law, but limits the deposits which may be accepted by such "interstate" branches to
the types of foreign-related deposits (le., deposits from foreign persons not residing in the
United States or deposits related to international trade or investment) which may be accepted
by Edge Act corporations. See id. at 10.
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to the current banking structure."74
Pursuant to Congress' directive, President Carter issued his report
on the McFadden Act in January 198l." President Carter's report went
beyond Congress' directive and recommended three substantial modifica-
tions of the Douglas Amendment as well as the McFadden Act. First,
the report recommended that the Douglas Amendment be modified to
permit interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies re-
gardless of state law, although at first only on a regional basis.76 Second,
the report advocated a phased liberalization of the McFadden Act with
the ultimate objective of permitting national banks, without state ap-
proval, to deploy electronic funds transfer (EFT) terminals nationwide
and to establish interstate brick-and-mortar branches within "natural
market areas" (for example, metropolitan areas)." Third, the report
suggested that the Douglas Amendment should be amended to permit
bank holding companies to acquire out-of-state "failing banks" without
state permission.78
Notwithstanding the far-reaching recommendations of President
Carter's report, Congress has adopted only the third-and most lim-
ited-of its suggestions. Under section 116 of the Garn-St Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982, 79 Congress has authorized the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to approve, without state per-
mission, the acquisition of a closed bank having total assets of $500 mil-
lion or more (or a mutual savings bank of equal size in danger of closing)
by an out-of-state bank holding company. However, section 116 pre-
serves a substantial degree of state determination. For example, if the
responsible state bank supervisor objects to such an acquisition, the
FDIC may approve the acquisition only by a unanimous vote of its
Board of Directors. Moreover, in evaluating bids by bank holding com-
panies for a closed or failing bank, the FDIC must give priority to bid-
ders located within the same state as the bank, or (if an out-of-state
bidder is to be chosen) to bidders located in adjacent states. Finally, any
bank acquired by an out-of-state bank holding company pursuant to sec-
tion 116 may thereafter establish branches only to the extent that it
would be permitted to do so as a national bank under the McFadden
74. S. REP. No. 1073, supra note 67, at 19.
75. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP'T OF THE TREAS., GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 1981).
76. Id at 17-18.
77. Id. at 19.
78. d at 20.
79. Act of Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 116, 96 Stat. 1469, 1476 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(0 (1982)).
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Act.8 0
In sum, Congress has reconsidered the Douglas Amendment on sev-
eral occasions since its enactment in 1956. Each time, Congress has reaf-
firmed the Douglas Amendment (with the carefully limited exception
involving acquisitions of failing banks), despite repeated claims that the
Amendment should be rescinded or modified.81 Accordingly, there can
be no doubt of Congress' intent that the states should retain their author-
ity to determine the extent to which bank holding companies may ex-
pand across state lines.
V. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE DOUGLAS AMENDMENT AND
STATE STATUTES ENACTED THEREUNDER
The federal courts have uniformly interpreted the Douglas Amend-
ment in accordance with Congress' intent that the states should have full
power to regulate the extent to which out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies may acquire in-state banks. None of these decisions has suggested
that the authority of the states under the Douglas Amendment is nar-
rowly limited to the all or nothing choice advocated by petitioners.
Moreover, petitioners' argument that the Douglas Amendment does not
permit the states to impose regional and other "discriminatory" limita-
tions on interstate bank acquisitions is contrary to the actions taken by
more than twenty states in permitting varying degrees of entry. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board and the courts have consistently given effect to such
state laws.
A. Judicial Interpretations of the Douglas Amendment
Three Courts of Appeals-the District of Columbia Circuit in Iowa
Independent Bankers, the Second Circuit in Northeast Bancorp, and the
Third Circuit in Girard Bank-have interpretated the Douglas Amend-
ment. In addition, the Supreme Court discussed the Douglas Amend-
ment in dicta in Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.82 Each of these
decisions has construed the statute to grant broad authority to the states
80. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 47 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3054, 3059-60, 3101; S. REP. No. 641, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1982)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3128, 3128-29.
81. Although such post-enactment events are not entitled to be given the same weight as
contemporaneous legislative history in construing the Douglas Amendment, the Supreme
Court has stated that post-enactment history can properly be relied upon to give "further
confirmation of Congress' intent." Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 166-67 n.19 (1982).
82. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
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to determine the circumstances under which out-of-state bank holding
companies may acquire in-state banks.
In Iowa Independent Bankers, the District of Columbia Circuit con-
sidered the effect of a 1972 Iowa statute, 3 which "grandfathered" the
right of one out-of-state bank holding company (Northwest Bancorpora-
tion, which owned four Iowa banks in 1972) to continue to acquire banks
in Iowa, but barred all such acquisitions by other out-of-state holding
companies." The Iowa Independent Bankers argued that the state stat-
ute was invalid under both the Douglas Amendment and the equal pro-
tection clause, and claimed that the Douglas Amendment authorized
Iowa to decide only whether to permit entry by all out-of-state bank
holding companies or by none.85
The court of appeals upheld the Iowa statute. First, the court found
that the Iowa legislature had acted in a "rational" manner, for purposes
of the equal protection clause, in concluding that Northwest Bancorpora-
tion (which had a "pre-existing stake in the Iowa banking system" and
had "proven itself to be a positive force in the system") should be treated
differently from other out-of-state bank holding companies. 86 The court
also upheld Iowa's decision that "the state would not be well served if
out-of-state bank holding companies were allowed wholesale entry into
the Iowa market."8" Second, after reviewing the legislative history of the
Douglas Amendment, 8 the court rejected the "all or nothing" interpre-
tation advanced by the petitioner:
Senator Douglas seems to anticipate that states might be selec-
tive in allowing bank holding companies to cross state lines ...
[ .. T]he intent of the Douglas Amendment was to as-
sure that the states had sufficient power to control the expan-
sion of bank holding companies across state lines so that such
expansion would not contravene state policy. Petitioner's sug-
gested interpretation of section 1842(d) would rob the states of
83. Iowa Code Ann. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
84. 511 F.2d at 1294.
85. Id. at 1294-96.
86. Id at 1294.
87. Id.
88. The court of appeals also referred to § 7 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1846 (1982), which reserves to each state "such powers and jurisdiction which it now has
[that is, in 1956, when § 7 was enacted] or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank
holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof." 511 F.2d at 1296 n.10. See supra note 51. With
respect to the state authority preserved under § 7, the court of appeals stated: "[T]here can be
no doubt that prior to the passage of the [BHC] Act, the states were free to regulate in-state
bank acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding companies." 511 F.2d at 1296.
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this power. In short, we think that petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that Congress intended to bar discrimination of the
sort found in Iowa Code Ann. § 524.1805.89
It is significant that the District of Columbia Circuit, having found
that the Douglas Amendment granted to the states a generalpower to be
"selective" with respect to acquisitons of in-state banks by out-of-state
bank holding companies, placed the burden upon the petitioner to prove
that Congress intended to bar Iowa from imposing the challenged "dis-
crimination." The same approach is fully warranted in the Supreme
Court's consideration of Northeast Bancorp.
In 1983, the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed its decision in
Iowa Independent Bankers, and reaffirmed its holding that "the Douglas
Amendment empowered states to discriminate among out-of-state bank
holding companies when deciding which could enter." 90 These judicial
findings, which were based upon a careful review of the legislative history
of the Douglas Amendment, contradict the arguments presented by peti-
tioners in Northeast Bancorp.
The Second Circuit's decision in Northeast Bancorp, which is under
review in the Supreme Court, adopted a similarly broad interpretation of
the Douglas Amendment. The Second Circuit determined that the Con-
necticut and Massachusetts regional banking statutes did not violate the
commerce clause because the Douglas Amendment authorized the states
to permit entry by out-of-state bank holding companies on a regional
basis.91 In addition, the Second Circuit found that the Connecticut and
Massachusetts laws did not violate the compact clause because they did
not "encroach upon or interfere with the supremacy of the United
States." 92 In this regard, the Court gave deference to the Federal Re-
serve Board's finding that the Douglas Amendment represented a "'re-
nunciation of federal interest in regulating the interstate acquisitions of
banks by bank holding companies."""
Finally, the Second Circuit determined that the regional limitation
contained in the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes did not violate
the equal protection clause because the limitation was rationally related
to those states' legitimate concern that "their banks could be dominated
89. 511 F.2d at 1296-97 (emphasis added).
90. Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604, 613, 615 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 1708 (1984).
91. 740 F.2d at 207-08.
92. Id. at 209 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
471 (1978)).
93. Id. at 207 (quoting Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 380 (1984)).
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by large bank holding companies located in New York or Chicago if such
holding companies were allowed to acquire their banks."9' The court
pointed out that each of the four largest bank holding companies in New
York had greater assets than those of all New England bank holding
companies combined.95
Most recently, the Third Circuit considered the Douglas Amend-
ment in Girard Bank. In that case, Mellon National Corporation, a
Pennsylvania bank holding company, sought to acquire control of Heri-
tage National Bank, a New Jersey national bank which owned a
"grandfathered" (pre-McFadden Act) branch in Philadelphia. Mellon
argued that the acquisition did not require New Jersey's authorization,
because Heritage was not "located outside of Pennsylvania" in view of its
Philadelphia branch. The Board and the Third Circuit rejected this ar-
gument, since Heritage maintained ninety branches and more than
ninety-nine percent of its deposits in New Jersey.9 6 The Third Circuit
therefore held that Mellon could not proceed with the acquisition with-
out New Jersey's specific authorization, in view of "the control over the
ownership of banks within its borders that Congress clearly intended
[New Jersey] to have."97
The Supreme Court discussed the Douglas Amendment in dicta in
BT Investment, which struck down a Florida statute prohibiting out-of-
state bank holding companies from establishing nonbanking investment
advisory subsidiaries in Florida. The Comptroller of Florida argued that
the Douglas Amendment gave Florida implicit authority to control ac-
quisitions of nonbanking entities by out-of-state bank holding companies.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that section 3(d) by
its terms applies only to acquisitions of banks, but made the following
observations with respect to section 3(d):
The language of the [Douglas Amendment] establishes a gen-
eral federal prohibition on the acquisition or expansion of bank-
ing subsidiaries across state lines. The only authority granted
to the States is the authority to create exceptions to this general
prohibition, that is, to permit expansion of banking across state
lines where it otherwise would be federally prohibited. 98
94. Id. at 209.
95. Id. at 209 n.16.
96. Girard Bank v. Board of Governors, 748 F.2d 838, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 842.
98. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 47 (1980) (emphasis in original). The
Supreme Court also said that "it is doubtful that § 3(d) authorizes state restrictions of any
nature on bank holding company activities." Id This statement must be evaluated in the
context of the BTInvestment case, where the Comptroller of Florida argued that § 3(d) per-
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Connecticut and Massachusetts have done precisely what the
Supreme Court said the states may do under the Douglas Amendment:
they have created "exceptions" to the general federal prohibition on in-
terstate bank acquisitions and thereby "permit" acquisition which would
otherwise be federally prohibited. Significantly, the Supreme Court did
not express any limitation on state authority to create "exceptions"
under section 3(d).
In sum, the relevant judicial authorities confirm what the terms and
legislative history of the Douglas Amendment indicate-namely, that
Congress has granted to the states a broad power to determine the extent
to which interstate bank acquisitions may occur. These authorities
plainly contradict petitioners' argument that the states lack authority to
impose geographic or other allegedly "discriminatory" limitations on in-
terstate acquisitions.
B. State Statutes Enacted Pursuant to the Douglas Amendment
As of March 15, 1985, twenty-two states have adopted statutes pur-
suant to the Douglas Amendment which permit varying degrees of entry
by out-of-state bank holding companies. The first such statute was
Iowa's 1972 "grandfather" statute,99 which was upheld in Iowa In-
dependent Bankers."°° Since 1972, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska and Utah
have enacted similar "grandfather" statutes, which permit interstate
bank acquisitions only by those out-of-state bank holding companies
which had a specified type of presence in the state on a stipulated date. 101
In addition, beginning in 1980, six states have adopted "limited pur-
pose" interstate banking laws. These laws generally permit an out-of-
state bank holding company to acquire a single in-state bank to carry on
a specified and limited type of business, usually the issuance of credit
cards. These statutes also often require the limited-purpose bank to em-
ploy a minimum number of state residents and to operate at a single
location in a manner which does not attract customers of local banks."02
mitted Florida to prohibit out-of-state bank holding companies from engaging in nonbanking
activities which were otherwise permitted by federal laws under § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. In
contrast, the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes permit out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies to make acquisitions of banks which would otherwise be prohibited under § 3(d), and this
is exactly the type of state action contemplated by the Supreme Court's dicta quoted above in
the text.
99. IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
100. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.29(3)(d) (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 2510 (Smith-
Hurd 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-903 (Com. Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-2(4)
(Supp. 1984).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 803 (Cum. Supp. 1984); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 5-
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In addition, four states have authorized out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies to acquire failing or closed banks subject to specified conditions.
10 3
Two states-Alaska and Maine-permit acquisitions of in-state
banks by any out-of-state bank holding company, but impose certain
conditions on such acquisitions. 1" Similarly, New York does not allow
an out-of-state bank holding company to acquire New York banks unless
that holding company's home state extends reciprocal privileges to New
York bank holding companies.
1 0 5
On December 30, 1982, Massachusetts adopted the first regional in-
terstate banking law. The Massachusetts statute authorizes an out-of-
state bank holding company to acquire an in-state bank if: (1) the hold-
ing company (as well as any parent company thereof) conducts its princi-
pal banking operations and maintains its principal place of business in
one of the other five New England states; and (2) the holding company's
home state provides reciprocal privileges to Massachusetts bank holding
companies. 106
In 1983, Connecticut and Rhode Island enacted regional interstate
banking laws similar to the Massachusetts statute.10 7 Florida, Georgia,
North Carolina and South Carolina subsequently have adopted recipro-
cal laws which authorize interstate bank acquisitions among them (and
other Southeastern states which enact similar laws) beginning on July 1,
1985 (or July 1, 1986 in the case of South Carolina).10 8 Kentucky, Ore-
gon and Utah have also enacted interstate banking laws with regional
901 to 5-908 (Cum. Supp. 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-1512 (Supp. 1983 & 1984); NEB. REv.
STAT. ch. 666.132 (Cum. Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 51-16-40 to 51-16-45
(1980 & Supp. 1984); VA. CODE §§ 6.1-390 to 6.1-397 (1983).
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 2508"(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); 1985 Or. Laws ch. 12;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-19-1 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.04.230 (Supp. 1985).
104. Maine imposes minimum capitalization requirements on banks which are acquired by
out-of-state bank holding companies and requires any such acquisitions to bring "net new
funds" into Maine. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9B § 1013 (Supp. 1984). Alaska permits out-of-
state bank holding companies to acquire only banks established prior to July 1, 1982. ALASKA
STAT. § 06.05.235 (Supp. 1984).
105. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 142-b (McKinney Supp. 1984).
106. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984).
107. 1983 Conn. Pub. Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.), § 2, as amended by 1984 Conn. Pub. Act 329
(Reg. Sess.), § 1; RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-1 & 19-30-2 (Supp. 1983). The regional limitation
contained in Rhode Island's statute is scheduled to expire on July 1, 1986.
108. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.295 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE § 7-1-620, et seq. (Supp.
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-209 to 53-218 (Interim Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE tit. 34, ch. 24
(Supp. 1984). These laws are not identical. For example, Georgia does not include (as do the
other states) Arkansas, Maryland, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia within the
defined Southeastern region for reciprocal acquisitions.
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and reciprocal limitations. 109 In addition, about twenty other states are
likely to consider regional banking legislation in 1985.110
The Federal Reserve Board has consistently given effect to state-
adopted interstate banking laws with "grandfather," '111 "limited pur-
pose," '112 and "failed bank" limitations." 3 Moreover, in a series of three
decisions upheld by the Second Circuit in Northeast Bancorp, the Board
approved acquisitions pursuant to the Connecticut and Massachusetts
statutes.11 4 The Board also denied an application by Bank of New York
Company, Inc. (BNY), a New York bank holding company, to acquire
Petitioner Northeast, a Connecticut bank holding company, in violation
of the regional limitation contained in Connecticut's statute." 5 In the
Bank of New York case, the Board specifically rejected BNY's argument
that Connecticut had opened its borders to entry by all out-of-state bank
holding companies when it adopted its regional banking statute:
BNY's interpretation of the Douglas Amendment would
transform the numerous state statutes that allow acquisition of
banks by limited classes of out-of-state bank holding companies
into unlimited-entry statutes. BNY's argument, if accepted,
would cause full interstate banking in those states, a result con-
trary to the Congressional intent underlying the Douglas Amend-
ment of allowing the states to apply their own policies regarding
interstate banking to the acquisition by out-of-state bank hold-
ing companies of banks located within the borders of a state.
Such a sweeping reinterpretation of the Douglas Amendment
should appropriately be accomplished only by legislative
109. Ky. REv. STAT. § 287.900-287.905 (Cum. Supp. 1984); 1985 Or. Laws ch. 12; UTAH
CODE ANN. § § 7-1-102 & 7-1-702 (interim Supp. 1984).
110. See Sudo, Interstate Bills Dominate State Slates in '85, AM. BANKER, Dec. 28, 1984, at
1.
111. E.g., Northwest Bancorporation, 38 FED. REG. 21530 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Iowa
Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir.) (Iowa law), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 875 (1975); NCNB Corp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 54 (1982) (Florida law).
112. E.g., Citicorp, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 181 (1981) (South Dakota law); J.P. Morgan & Co.,
67 Fed. Res. Bull. 917 (1981) (Delaware law); Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 101 (1985) (Nevada
law).
113. E.g., BankAmerica Corp., 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 568 (1983) (Washington law).
114. Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984); Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 353 (1984); Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524 (1984). Since the
Second Circuit's decision in Northeast Bancorp, the Boad has approved further acquisitions
under the Rhode Island, Florida and Georgia statutes. E.g., Hartford Nat'l Corp., 71 Fed.
Res. Bull. 43 (1985) (Rhode Island law); SunTrust Banks, Inc., 71 Fed. Res, Bull. 176 (1985)
(Florida and Georgia law).
115. Bank of New York Co., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 527 (1984).
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The Board's assessment of the validity of state regional banking
laws, and its evaluation of congressional intent as embodied in the Doug-
las Amendment, are entitled to the "greatest deference" in view of the
Board's primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the BHC
Act.1 7 As shown below, petitioners in Northeast Bancorp are presenting,
in effect, the same "all or nothing" argument advanced by BNY, and
petitioners' contentions therefore are erroneous for the reasons stated by
the Board.
VI. THE VALIDITY OF STATE REGIONAL BANKING LAWS UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Supreme Court held in BT Investment,'18 that the commerce
clause applies to state regulation of nonbanking financially-related serv-
ices provided by bank holding companies. However, the Court also
pointed out that Congress may "confe[r] upon the States an ability to
restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise
enjoy." '119 In view of the terms and legislative history of the Douglas
Amendment, it is clear that Congress has authorized the states to adopt
regional banking laws. Accordingly, such laws do not violate the com-
merce clause.
A. The Supreme Court's Analysis in Commerce Clause Cases
Involving Congressional Grants of Regulatory Authority to the
States
Petitioners argue that the.Douglas Amendment does not represent
"specific Congressional authorization for. . . concerted, discriminatory
state statutes." They contend that Congress must "deliberately and spe-
cifically authoriz[e] the particular deviation from the constitutional man-
date" which is at issue, and that "the Douglas Amendment says nothing
about groups of states joining together to discriminate against commerce
116. Id at 528 (emphasis added). The Board stated in Bank of New York, as it did in Bank
of New England, that the constitutionality of state regional banking laws "is not free from
doubt," but the Board concluded in each case that "there is no clear and unequivocal basis to
find these statutes to be inconsistent with the Constitution." 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 528. See
also 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 376-77.
117. E.g., Board of Governors v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1981); Board of Gover-
nors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978).
118. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980).
119. Id at44.
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deriving from disfavored sister states."1 20
Petitioners' analysis is contrary to the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in determining whether Congress has authorized the
states to regulate an area of interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
has stated that Congress must "affirmatively contemplate" state regula-
tion of interstate commerce in order to immunize it from scrutiny under
the commerce clause.1 21 However, rather than requiring "specific" au-
thorization for each "particular [state] deviation" from the commerce
clause-as petitioners argue-the Supreme Court has held instead that if
Congress generally authorizes the states to regulate a defined field of
commerce, all state regulation pursuant to such authority is valid under
the commerce clause: "If Congress ordains that the States may freely
regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State
within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered invulner-
able to Commerce Clause challenge."122
In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equali-
zation,1 23 as well as in its earlier decision Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin,"2 4 the Supreme Court determined that "Congress removed all
Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the States to regulate
and tax the business of insurance when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act." 2 The Court particularly relied upon section 2(a) of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, which provides: "'The business of insurance ...
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regu-
lation or taxation of such business.' "126 The Court noted that the "une-
quivocal language of the Act suggests no exceptions."'' 27 The Court also
emphasized that Congress had enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act
against the background of extensive state regulation of insurance: "[I]n
taking this action Congress must have had full knowledge of the nation-
wide existence of state systems of regulation and taxation [of insurance]
... . [I]ts purpose was evidently to throw the whole weight of its power
120. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 18, 22-23 (emphasis added). See also
Brief for Petitioners Northeast and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 22-23, 26.
121. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2242 (1984).
122. Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981)
(emphasis added).
123. 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981).
124. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
125. Western & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 653 (citations omitted). See also Prudential, 328 U.S. at
430, 436.
126. Western & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 653.
127. Id.
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Having determined that the McCarran-Ferguson Act granted to the
states a general power to regulate and tax the business of insurance, the
Court rejected the contention that the commerce clause prevented the
states from imposing " 'anti-competitive state taxation that discriminates
against out-of-state insurers.' ,129 The Court found "no such limitation
in the language or history of the Act."' 130 Accordingly, in Prudential the
Court upheld a South Carolina tax which applied only to out-of-state
insurance companies, and in Western & Southern Life the Court sus-
tained a California "retaliatory tax" that was assessed against insurance
companies from other states that imposed taxes higher than those of
California.
Significantly, the Court did not base its holdings in Western &
Southern Life and Prudential upon a finding that the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act specifically authorized the states to adopt discriminatory taxes
with respect to out-of-state insurance companies. The Court found it
sufficient that Congress had generally authorized the states to regulate
and tax the business of insurance.' 3 ' Thus, the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in these cases contradicts the petitioners' argument that the
Douglas Amendment must have "specifically" contemplated the enact-
ment of state regional banking laws. 132
B. The General and Unqualified Regulatory Power Granted to the
States by the Douglas Amendment
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Western & Southern Life and
Prudential is directly applicable to the controversy surrounding state re-
gional banking laws. The express language of the Douglas Amendment,
in a manner similar to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, grants to the states a
general and unqualified power to regulate interstate acquisitions of banks
by bank holding companies. The Douglas Amendment provides that
such an acquisition may not occur unless it is "specifically authorized by
the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to
that effect and not merely by implication."' 33 It would be difficult to
conceive of a more explicit nd unconditional delegation of power by Con-
128. Prudential, 328 U.S. at 430. See also Western & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 654 (quoting
Prudential, 328 U.S. at 430).
129. Western & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 653.
130. Id.
131. Ma at 653-55; Prudential, 328 U.S. 429-31.
132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
133. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
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gress to the states.13 4
Moreover, as in the case of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, there is no
indication that Congress has placed restrictions on the authority granted
to the states under the Douglas Amendment. In BT Investment, the
Supreme Court stated that the Douglas Amendment authorizes the states
"to create exceptions . . .[which] permit expansion of banking across
state lines where it otherwise would be federally prohibited." 135  The
Court did not indicate any limitation on the authority of the states to
create such "exceptions." In fact, while the Court held that section 7 of
the BHC Act authorized the states to enact statutes only "within the
boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause,"' 36 it stated no such view
with respect to the Douglas Amendment, which is contained in section
3(d) of the Act.
As shown above in Part III(B), the legislative history of the Douglas
Amendment confirms what explicit. terms of the statute indicate-
namely, that Congress intended to provide the states with broad author-
ity to determine the extent to which interstate bank acquisitions could
occur. Senator Douglas stated that his amendment would permit out-of-
state holding companies to acquire banks in other states "only to the de-
gree that State laws expressly permit them."' 37 Similarly, Senator Robert-
son, the chief sponsor of the BHC Act, acknowledged (although opposed
to the Douglas Amendment) that the Amendment would provide that
134. In contrast, the cases relied upon by the petitioners involved federal statutes which did
not contain any similar delegation of power to the states. In South-Central Timber Dev., Inc.
v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2241-43 (1984), the federal statutes in question dealt only with
timber cut from federal lands and did not apply to state lands. In New England Power Co. v.
New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982), the federal statute contained only "a standard 'nonpre-
emption' clause" which granted no additional authority to the states. Id. at 340-43. Finally,
each of the federal statutes involved in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958-60 (1982),
contained only a similar nonpreemption clause and a provision stating that water rights arising
in connection with federal projects would be governed by state law. Id. at 959. The latter
provision was not relevant to the state reciprocity restriction on exportation of water which
was at issue in Sporhase.
135. 447 U.S. at 47 (emphasis in original). See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
136. 447 U.S. at 49.
137. 102 CONG. Rnc. 6858 (1956) (emphasis added). Petitioners claim that the Supreme
Court should not give credence to Senator Douglas' remarks because they represent only "iso-
lated fragments" of legislative history. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 27, and
Brief for Petitioners Northeast and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 26 (quoting New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 342 (1982)).
However, New England Power involved only the brief floor remarks of a single Congress-
man. In contrast, the Senate's discussion of the Douglas Amendment covers more than eight
pages of the Congressional Record, 102 CONG. RFC. at 6760-61 & 6856-63, and every Senator
who described the legal effect of the Douglas Amendment concurred with Senator Douglas'
description. See 102 CONG. REc. 6760 (remarks of Sen. Robertson); id. at 6860 (remarks of
Sen. Bennett); iad at 6861 (remarks of Sen. Bricker); id at 6862 (statement of Sen. Payne).
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"no bank holding company in the future may cross a State line unless the
laws of the State involved permit it to do so."
138
Senator Douglas repeatedly pointed to the McFadden Act as the
model for his amendment.1 39 As described above in Part II(B)(3), the
McFadden Act (as amended in 1933) authorized national banks to estab-
lish branches only in "those States the laws of which permit [branching],
and even there 'only to the extent that the State laws permit branch bank-
ing.' " Under the McFadden Act, the federal courts have held that
branching by national banks is subject to state laws which regulate the
method by which branches may be established,"a ' or which place geo-
graphical limitations on the opening of branches. 42 Senator Douglas
himself noted that, in 1956, New York was divided by state branching
laws into ten geographic zones, and that both state and national banks
were prohibited from branching outside the zone where their home of-
fices were located.143 Thus, Senator Douglas' statement that his amend-
ment would embody "the principles of the McFadden Act" 1" strongly
indicates that Congress intended to permit the states to place geographi-
cal and other limitations on acquisitions of banks by out-of-state bank
holding companies.
These extended and consistent statements cannot be dismissed as "isolated fragments" of legis-
lative history.
Petitioners also quote Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979), for the proposi-
tion that "[t]he remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing
legislative history." Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 27; Brief for Petitioners
Northeast and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 26 n.23. The Court in Chrysler Corp. explained
that "[the sponsor's] statement must be considered with the Reports of both Houses and the
statements of other Congressmen." 441 U.S. at 311. Unlike the 1958 amendment to 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1982), which was considered in Chrysler Corp., however, the Douglas Amendment was
not included in a House or Senate committee bill and there are no committee reports to con-
sider in this case. Therefore, Senator Douglas' remarks are "an authoritative guide to the
statute's construction," North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982), and
gain further significance in view of their consistency with the statements of other Senators who
both supported and opposed the Douglas Amendment. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564-66 (1976); Hilton v. Sullivan, 34 U.S. 323, 338-39 (1948).
138. 102 CONG. REc. 6760 (1956) (emphasis added).
139. 102 CONG. REc. 6858, 6860 (1956).
140. First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966)
(emphasis added).
141. See eg., id at 261-62 (1966) (state law permitting branching only by merger with an
existing bank).
142. E.g., First Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, 600 F.2d 91, 94, 96-99 (7th Cir.)
(state law prohibiting branching except in a city or town where no other bank is located), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979); Nat'l Bank of Detroit v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537,
539-41 (6th Cir.) (state law prohibiting branching in a city or village in which another bank
has its main office or a branch), cert denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
143. 102 CONG. REC. 6858 (1956).
144. Id at 6860.
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It is also evident from Senator Douglas' remarks that each state
would have authority to be "selective" and to admit out-of-state bank
holding companies on a case-by-case and state-by-state basis. 145 In fact,
certain Senators who opposed the Douglas Amendment attacked the pro-
vision on the ground that it would mandate "discrimination" in inter-
state commerce, thus confirming the understanding of both proponents
and opponents that the Douglas Amendment would authorize the states
to regulate interstate bank acquisitions without regard to commerce
clause limitations.
1 46
C. The Petitioners' All or Nothing Interpretation of the Douglas
Amendment
In contrast to the broad state authority indicated by the terms and
legislative history of the Douglas Amendment, petitioners would effec-
tively relegate to the states the mere choice of permitting entry by all out-
of-state bank holding companies or by none. Petitioners argue that the
Douglas Amendment does not make state laws enacted thereunder "im-
mune from the commerce clause."' 47 If this position were correct, it
would create substantial doubt as to the validity of all of the state-en-
acted interstate banking laws discussed above in Part V(B), because none
of those laws permit out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire in-
state banks on the same basis as in-state holding companies.1
48
Petitioner Citicorp seeks to distinguish state regional banking laws
from other state laws.' 49 However, as the Solicitor General has pointed
out, state laws which place "reciprocal" or "limited purpose" conditions
on bank acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding companies are of
doubtful validity, unless the Douglas Amendment immunizes such laws
from scrutiny under the commerce clause.'5 0
145. See Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288, 1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. See also National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458-61 (1974); Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S.
323, 339 (1948).
147. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 21. See also Brief for Petitioners North-
east and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 22.
148. See e.g., BTlnvestment, 447 U.S. at 36-37.
149. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 6, at 37. Citicorp has a strong incentive to
defent the validity of state limited-purpose laws because it has actively exploited the interstate
banking opportunities provided by such laws. See supra note 112.
150. Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 8, at 13-14 n.18. See, e.g., Great Atl. &
Pae. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (state law placing reciprocity condition on impor-
tation of out-of-state milk violated commerce clause); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949) (state order prohibiting establishment of in-state milk plant by out-of-state
corporation, on ground that proposed plant would divert customers from existing in-state
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Thus, petitioners effectively would require each state either to per-
mit bank acquisitions by all out-of-state bank holding companies without
any conditions, or to allow no such acquisitions. This all or nothing in-
terpretation of the Douglas Amendment is directly contrary to the deci-
sions of the Federal Reserve Board in Bank of New York, the District of
Columbia Circuit in Iowa Independent Bankers and the Second Circuit in
Northeast Bancorp.'5
Moreover, petitioners' interpretation contravenes the fundamental
federal policy that the states should have full authority to determine their
respective banking structures, in order to ensure a decentralized and un-
concentrated banking system. As shown above in Parts II through IV,
Congress consistently has affirmed the right of each state to regulate
branching by state and national banks within its borders, and to control
acquisitions of in-state banks by out-of-state bank holding companies.
Congress has also repeatedly rejected proposals which would allow na-
tional banks to establish branches, or permit bank holding companies to
acquire banks across state lines, without regard to state laws.'5 '
As in the case of the insurance business, Congress has acted with
"full knowledge" of the different state systems for regulating banking
structure, and has "throw[n] the whole weight of its power behind the
state systems."' 5 3  Accordingly, state regional banking laws operate
within the scope of authority granted by Congress and, therefore, do not
violate the commerce clause.
VII. THE VALIDITY OF STATE REGIONAL BANKING LAWS UNDER
THE COMPACT CLAUSE
Petitioners contend that the Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode
Island regional banking statutes constitute a "compact" which "inflicts
substantial injury on all excluded states" and "impermissibly disrupts the
balance of power between the states and the Federal Government" with
plants, was contrary to commerce clause); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
(state law limiting size of freight and passenger trains violated commerce clause).
151. See supra notes 88-93 & 116-17 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 36-42 & 74-81 and accompanying text. The only exception Congress
has made to the policy of state control over banking structure is 12 U.S.C. § 1823(0 (1982),
which authorizes the FDIC, under carefully defined circumstances, to arrange an acquisition
of a closed bank by an out-of-state bank holding company without state permission. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text. The fact that Congress has created this express and carefully
limited exception to state authority under the Douglas Amendment seriously undermines peti-
tioners' efforts to create additional implied exceptions to state authority thereunder. See An-
drus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 13, at
§ 47.11.
153. Prudential, 328 U.S. at 430.
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respect to the regulation of banking.154 Because Congress has not specifi-
cally consented to these state laws, petitioners claim that they violate the
compact clause.
Petitioners' analysis is unsound in several respects. First, it does not
appear that the challenged statutes represent a "compact." Despite peti-
tioners' arguments concerning the effect of the consultations and commu-
nications between Connecticut and Massachusetts legislators,155 the fact
is that each of the statutes was enacted independently. Unlike other cases
in which the Court has found a "compact," the New England statutes do
not embody a formal agreement between states, 156 nor do they create
powers which: (1) may be exercised by an authority separate from each
enacting state; and (2) are conditioned upon the acceptance of other
states. 157 On the contrary, each of the challenged statutes independently
specifies the circumstances under which bank holding companies from
other states may acquire banks within the enacting state's borders.'5 8
Second, even assuming arguendo that the challenged statutes are
based upon an implicit agreement, the Supreme Court has held that such
reciprocal state laws do not create a "compact" which requires congres-
sional consent unless they result in an "enhancement of state power at
the expense of the federal supremacy."1 59 As the Supreme Court held in
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, "the test [under
the compact clause] is whether the Compact enhances state power quoad
the National Government." 1"
The challenged statutes create no such "compact," because they do
not authorize the enacting states to exercise any powers collectively which
154. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 14. See also Brief for Petitioners North-
east and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 33.
155. Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 5-6, 39-40; Brief for Petitioners Northeast
and Union Trust, supra note 8, at 32. The Federal Reserve Board noted the degrees of consul-
tation and communication among New England legislators and said that the Connecticut and
Massachusetts statutes "can be considered to be part of an implicit compact or agreement."
But the Board did not rely upon any finding of an actual compact. Bank of New England
Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 380.
156. Compare, eg., New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (consent decree locating
boundary line not a compact) with Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) (agreement
fixing boundary line is a compact).
157. But see, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 491-
93 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (agreement creating multistate commission with power to
conduct audits and issue subpoenas, and whose existence was conditioned upon the approval
of at least seven states not a compact).
158. It is significant that the legal effect of each of the challenged statutes was not condi-
tioned upon reciprocal action by any specified number of states. Cf. id.
159. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 469-70. See also New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S.
1, 6 (1959); Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 586 (1953).
160. 434 U.S. at 473.
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each state could not exercise individually. 161 As shown above, the Doug-
las Amendment authorizes each state to adopt legislation controlling the
extent to which out-of-state bank holding companies may acquire in-state
banks. Under the Douglas Amendment, each state is free to place geo-
graphical and other limitations on such acquisitions. 162 Thus, even if the
challenged statutes were enacted pursuant to an agreement, they do no
more collectively than what Congress has empowered each state to do
separately under the Douglas Amendment. 163
Third, as already shown, Congress has completely deferred to state
regulation in the area of interstate bank acquisitions. Therefore, state
regional banking laws do not encroach upon any aspect of "federal
supremacy" in violation of the impact clause.
164
Finally, the challenged statutes do not injure non-New England
States in any manner which violates the compact clause. These statutes
regulate private corporations and in no way purport to affect the sover-
eignity of other states. Moreover, in the regulatory context, the Supreme
161. See id. at 474-75.
162. See supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
163. In support of their argument that the Douglas Amendment does not constitute con-
gressional "consent" for the challenged statutes, petitioners emphasize that in 1984 Congress
failed to approve bills which would have specifically authorized state regional banking laws
(e.g., Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 7, 47). However, petitioners' reliance on
such legislative history is unavailing for two reasons. First, in Multistate Tax Comm'n, the
Supreme Court's decision was not affected by the fact that Congress had failed to pass any of
the 12 bills which had been introduced to provide specific authorization for the challenged
commission. See 434 U.S. at 458 n.8, 486 (White, J., dissenting).
Second, in 1984 the Senate did pass a bill, S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 903 (1984), by a
vote of 89-5, which would have specifically authorized state regional banking laws. 130 CoNG.
REc. S11162, S11178 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). Senator Jake Garn, the chief sponsor and
floor manager of the bill, stated that the provision was "merely a clarification of the powers
that the States have always retained under the Douglas amendment," and was fully in accord
with the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Douglas Amendment in Northeast Bancorp. IL
at S 11153. See also id (remarks of Sen. Tsongas). Thus the only chamber of Congress which
actually considered the issue in 1984 overwhelmingly affirmed the authority of states to enact
regional banking laws. But see 130 CONG. REC. H10005 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1984) (remarks of
Rep. St Germain concerning absence of House hearings or debates on regional banking and
other provisions of S. 2851).
164. Despite petitioners' claims with respect to the "vital federal interest" in interstate
banking (eg., Brief for Petitioner Citicorp, supra note 8, at 45), the Supreme Court has specifi-
cally held that the existence of a "federal interest" is not sufficient to implicate the compact
clause. The Court emphasized that only a collective state encroachment upon "federal
supremacy" will violate the compact clause. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 479-80 n.33
(emphasis added). Moreover, in Northeast Bancorp both the Second Circuit and the Federal
Reserve Board concluded that the Douglas Amendment represents a" 'renunciation offederal
interest in regulating the interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies.'" North-
east Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 207 (quoting Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 380
(emphasis added)).
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Court has noted that actions by particular states may place "economic
pressure" on other states, but nevertheless held: "Unless that pressure
transgresses the bounds of the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, . . . it is not clear how our federal
structure is implicated."' 165
As shown above in Part VI, state regional banking laws do not vio-
late the commerce clause. In addition, corporations such as petitioners
are not within the class of persons protected by the privileges and immu-
nities clause.I66 Accordingly, petitioners have not demonstrated that the
challenged statutes will have any impact upon non-New England states
which is forbidden by the compact clause.
1 67
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the 1830's, the federal government consistently has deferred to
states with respect to the regulation of banking structure. Under the Mc-
Fadden Act and the Douglas Amendment, Congress has implemented
this federal policy by empowering the states to determine the extent to
which: (1) national and state banks may establish branches within their
borders; and (2) bank holding companies may acquire banks across their
borders. Moreover, Congress has repeatedly rejected proposed legisla-
tion which would have authorized interstate branching or interstate ac-
quisitions of banks by bank holding companies without state approval.
In view of this long-established history of federal deference to state
control of banking structure, as well as the terms and legislative history
of the Douglas Amendment, state regional banking laws plainly operate
within the scope of authority granted by Congress to the states. Accord-
ingly, these state laws do not violate the commerce clause, nor do they
intrude upon any area of "federal supremacy" in violation of the com-
pact clause. It therefore is evident that petitioners' challenge to the Con-
necticut and Massachusetts regional banking statutes in Northeast
165. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. at 478 (citation omitted).
166. Western & S. Life, 451 U.S. at 656.
167. As noted above, see supra note 95 and accompanying text, in Northeast Bancorp the
Second Circuit pointed out that the four largest bank holding companies in New York (includ-
ing petitioner Citicorp) have greater assets than those of all New England bank holding com-
panies combined. Northeast Bancbrp, 740 F.2d at 209 n.16. Thus, it is difficult to conceive
how the New England regional banking laws could place any kind of practical "economic
pressure" upon New York (the sole state outside New England represented by petitioners and
supporting amic). At most, the challenged statutes merely permit banks within New England
to consolidate and thereby compete on a less unequal basis with the much larger "money
center" banks in New York.
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Bancorp is without legal foundation, and that those statutes should be
upheld by the Supreme Court.

